



## 中国发展简报

### Editorial

# Riots underline development dilemmas

*Violent protests this month in Guangxi's Bobai (博白) County — sparked, according to international press reports, by heavy-handed implementation of birth control rules — are a tragic reminder of the pain caused by a policy that has, nevertheless, played a key role in China's social and economic transformation.*

According to the National Population and Family Planning Commission, the tough measures introduced at the end of the 1970s have prevented 400 million births — more than the entire, current population of the United States of America. Foreigners have generally been quick to deplore the authoritarian nature of the policy but slow to acknowledge its role in China's escape from poverty. Even as the world at large grows anxious about China's carbon footprint and about the spillage of its population overseas, there is widespread reluctance to acknowledge that it might have been a good idea to prevent an extra 800 million Chinese feet from treading on the planet.

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No-one in China likes the family planning policy but very few Chinese deny the need for population control. Most, of course, would like to be personally exempt from the draconian rules, yet fully understand that Mao Zedong's attitude to population growth was as calamitous as it was cavalier and that urgent action was overdue.

After nearly 30 years of a strict regimen, surveys suggest that few Chinese women now want large families, although many would like a second child and some would like three. Improvements in women's education and literacy (although faltering in recent years) have probably contributed more than state propaganda to the new preference for smaller families. Market mechanisms now also complement state rules. Steep rises in the costs of education and health care have made procreation expensive, and today's parents yearn to give their young a higher level of material consumption than previous generations aspired to. So the gap seems to be narrowing between what is permitted and what is desired.

But economic reform has also meant that China's population sacrifice is becoming unevenly distributed. For it is now relatively easy for well-off urban couples to buy the right to have a second child; whereas in Guangxi local officials were reportedly breaking and entering rural homes to seize goods in lieu of outstanding fines for bearing "out-of-plan" children.

Family planning is one of the very few areas in which rural people (especially ethnic minorities) enjoy some measure of preferential treatment compared to city dwellers — for the 'one child policy' is in fact generally implemented in the countryside as a 'one boy policy' and in many rural areas families with three children are quite commonplace.

Yet now, to the high human costs and adverse social impacts of the family planning regimen — which include skewed sex ratios at birth, "missing girls," unregistered children, child trafficking and an undersupply of younger people to care for seniors — must be added the gross injustice of China's nouveau riche being able to buy their way out of strictures forcefully applied to the rural poor. Small wonder that there was a domestic news black-out on the events in Guangxi, lest they spark simmering resentments elsewhere.

So what is to be done?

For more than a decade, several international agencies, including the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) have been working with China's family planning authorities to temper and moderate the implementation of the latter's tough mandate. China's central authorities are far from stupid and they recognise the need to do this, for China's sake if not for the world's. Pilot initiatives have included the provision of more comprehensive and "client-oriented" sexual health services; greater contraceptive choice; a counselling, rather than a hectoring approach to child spacing; more freedom for rural couples to decide upon this; the relinquishing, in some places, of the annual birth quota system; and a shift from financial sticks to carrots, including cash payments for observance of birth control requirements.

This has been honourable and humane international engagement. For their pains, the international agencies have been vilified by China's critics overseas, and the United States government has punished UNFPA with funding cuts. After Guangxi's spectacularly stupid return to the big stick approach, these international agencies will doubtless come under renewed pressure to abandon work with the "oppressive" Chinese. But events in Guangxi show the need to redouble those efforts, not to abandon them.

## HIV/AIDS:

## NGOs proliferate as the Global Fund steps in

*Although not an HIV hotspot, over the last three years China's north-eastern province of Heilongjiang has seen a surge of local NGOs working on AIDS prevention. But, Nick Young and Mian Liping (勉丽萍) ask, is this a civil society success story or an opportunistic response to the influx of international funds?*

HARBIN Away from the bright lights of Gogol Street, the main entertainment strip in this northern industrial city with historic ties to Russia, a Saturday night crowd has gathered in a downmarket bathhouse that caters for MSM — “men who have sex with men.”

A shower room that would not be out of place in a factory gives way to a resting area where around 50 men, mostly naked but some in close-fitting shorts, recline on couches, chatting, smoking cigarettes and flicking channels on a widescreen TV.

In a dimly lit area to the side, half a dozen couples cuddle under quilts.

Beyond a plastic screen are private cubicles where customers can go with one of the ten or so resident “money boys,” as male sex workers are called in China. They are a jaunty, good-looking crew, with feathery hair and fully dressed — in tight jeans, T shirts and leather jerkins.

According to Kang Tong (康同), a gay support

group that formed in Harbin in 2002, 90% of sexual encounters in such places are “high risk” — unprotected by the use of condoms and lubricants.

Harbin's Centre for Disease Control (CDC) reports that 2% of MSM who have come forward for voluntary HIV checks have tested positive. But Long Xiaoshuai (龙小帅), who has run a gay information website for several years, believes that the actual figure is much higher. HIV prevalence among the city's MSM is at least 4%, he says, adding that other sexually transmitted infections, including syphilis, are also rising steeply.

The MSM tag is apt in China where, facing family and social pressure, many gay men get married and have children but continue to seek same-sex partners. They refer to themselves ironically as *tongzhi* (同志, “comrades”).

Harbin's health officials now take a tolerant and pragmatic approach to the *tongzhi* and other high-risk groups. Last October, the city CDC hit national headlines with an AIDS prevention training workshop for women commercial sex workers. Although rampant, prostitution is officially outlawed in China.

Wen Yingchun (温迎春), who leads the CDC's HIV prevention efforts in the city, says that “Although total HIV prevalence is low, stigma is quite high. If there were more cases, it would be easier for people to see them as normal.”

To combat stigma, Wen and his CDC colleagues have conducted trainings for staff from other government and Communist Party agencies and parasatatal “mass organisations” such as the Womens Federation.

The Harbin city CDC and the CDC for Heilongjiang Province are housed in separate buildings: gleaming, new office blocks built in the wake of the 2003 SARS outbreak, when central authorities realised the need to boost

epidemic prevention efforts.

SARS is widely credited with alerting the authorities to the threat of a full-blown AIDS epidemic. At the end of 2003, the central government adopted a “four frees, one care” (四免一关怀) policy, pledging free HIV testing and counselling for all who want it, and free anti-retroviral treatment for people in economic hardship who have contracted the virus.

Health officials now also see NGOs as essential partners in HIV prevention among high-risk groups. The national CDC has set out to encourage and foster NGOs, with support from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, which is mainly bankrolled by Microsoft founder, Bill Gates.

## NGO incubator

The Global Fund has so far committed USD 190 million for AIDS prevention and care in China, with a growing proportion of this earmarked for NGO projects. A new funding round (Round 6) will see more than USD 17 million distributed to NGOs.

“Grassroots networks are very important and very necessary,” according to Wang Liqui (王立秋), who manages Global Fund Round 5 projects at the national CDC. “It is often hard for government health workers to reach high-risk groups,” he says, whereas NGOs find it easier to win trust through peer exchange and education.

Yet some government staff doubt whether Chinese NGOs, which have begun to emerge only in the last decade, are run well enough to put grants to effective and accountable use. Harbin CDC’s Wen Yingchun complains that the administration of some groups is “extremely slack” and that their use of funds is “casual.”

The CDC has therefore started to provide “capacity building training” for nascent NGOs.

Heilongjiang is one of the provinces where the national headquarters has rolled out such trainings, with an initial emphasis on the preparation of project proposals to the Global Fund.

One apparent result has been a rapid proliferation of *tongzhi* NGOs. Three years ago there were only a handful of such groups across the whole of north-east China. Now, CDC officials say, they now know of eight in Harbin alone, and fully 11 in the even more northerly city of Qiqihar (pop. 5.6 million).

Five of Heilongjiang’s gay groups, have been awarded Global Fund grants of CNY 20,000 (USD 2,600) each for projects that started in April of this year.

Kang Tong is one of the recipients, and will use the funds to encourage *tongzhi* bathhouse customers to go for voluntary HIV tests. The group also hopes to persuade more *tongzhi*, especially those who have contracted HIV, to “come out.”

Kang Tong members view the surge of new organisations sceptically. “Some of the new groups do things if they get money but do nothing if they don’t get money! This damages the reputation of the *tongzhi* community” says one 59-year-old member.

Long Xiaoshuai, whose website is the centrepiece of an NGO called Loving Sky (爱心天空), agrees that new groups are springing up in a scramble for funds. “There are two kinds of NGO in China” he says: “The wild grass variety and the hothouse variety.” The Global Fund, he implies, is primarily a hothouse.

## Still underground

Guo Yaqi (郭雅琦) of the Beijing Gender Health Education Institute (北京纪安德咨询中心) questions the efficacy of some *tongzhi* activism.

“Some donors start out thinking that if they find a gay representative then they will be able to

reach the MSM community,” he says.

However, he points out, in China most gay men are not yet ready to come out and they shun activities that attract attention. “Now a lot of programs are widely publicised and although some gay people do participate the majority don’t want to be involved because they are still semi-underground.”

“The main intervention approach is still rather narrow, focusing on fun activities and on distributing condoms,” Guo adds. “A lot of ‘trainings’ take place, but they are very basic and they don’t reach many people.”

Humphrey Wou (乌辛坤), whose California-based AIDS Relief Fund for China makes small grants to NGOs, believes that large-donor preference for condom promotion is stifling local initiative. Condom distribution, he says, “usually happens about once a week for three hours. They will go to two or three different spots — parks, bars, whatever.”

At best, he says, this reaches only a small fraction of the target community. “Moreover, given Chinese mentality, giving away things for free means that people will not buy them. People are missing the issue here.”

Wou also questions donor ambitions to “strengthen” NGO efforts. “People at the moment feel a lot of the grassroots NGOs are too small, so people get them together in networks or *pingtai* [平台, “platforms”]. But this creates the opposite effect of what is intended: frictions, tensions, criticisms.”

Wou would prefer “a wild flower effect: let them grow in their own way and in the end they cover the mountain.”

Zhao Donghui (赵东辉) of Heilongjiang CDC counters that he cannot understand criticism of CDC involvement with NGOs because “they need some level of government backing in order to work effectively.” For example, he says, the NGOs need to show that public activities are officially authorised in order to avoid police interference.

## Coming up for air

With the tacit acceptance of the authorities, an open gay scene is now developing and the “fun activities” mentioned by Guo Yaqi seem to be creating a more liberated gay identity for some.

Across town from the Harbin bathhouse is a mixed-sex gay bar where Saturday night brings a lively, young crowd. There is an open-mike singing competition and then Lu Hao (吕浩), a veteran of the Harbin scene and founder of Kang Tong, comperes an AIDS knowledge quiz.

Harbin’s first gay bar opened in 2002, says Lu, and several others have sprung up since 2004 when “government policy turned around completely.”

In private, Lu speaks nostalgically of times 20 years ago when men sought each other out in public parks in an “innocent” way. Now, he complains, although there is more freedom there is also more commercialisation of same-sex love.

But the government’s new acceptance of the gay community may be making it easier, especially for young men, to come out.

In neighbouring Liaoning Province, Mu Yang (牧羊) established a gay “telephone hotline” in the 1997 and this has now grown into an NGO, Dalian Rainbow (大连彩虹), similar to Harbin’s Kang Tong. Mu chose to tell his parents about his sexuality, and in 2005 — after the big swing in government policy — his father established an information and support club for the parents of gay people.

This more liberal atmosphere may encourage other men to come out instead of marrying, and thus reduce the number of women who are exposed to risk of infection from closet gay husbands.

*Nick Young and Mian Liping are preparing an in-depth Special Report on HIV/AIDS and Civil Society in China, for publication in September.*

## Open government

## A step forward, but with sideways shuffles

*China is introducing new transparency rules for government — in part, it seems, to curb corruption. But, reports Chang Tianle (常天乐), some progressive localities are ahead of the central government on this issue, and the national rules remain ambiguous as to how much the public has a right to know.*

China's first national regulations on public disclosure of government information have been cautiously welcomed by scholars and NGOs, but most say that China still has a long way to go to achieve transparent government.

The Regulations on Government Disclosure of Information (政府信息公开条例) were approved by the State Council on January 17, 2007 and take effect on May 1, 2008. Article 1 states that they aim to “ensure that citizens, legal persons and other organisations (公民、法人和其他组织) can obtain government information by lawful means, and increase government transparency.”

According to the new rules, all levels of government should take the initiative in making public (公开) “information that concerns the immediate interest” of citizens and organisations or that “requires wide public understanding and participation.” Public finances, social and economic planning, environment, health care, social security, and education are specified in the regulations as

areas where open information is required.

The regulations also require government to make public information on issues which have been the source of many local conflicts, such as land use, relocation and compensation, fees for public services, family planning and workplace safety.

All relevant government information should be made public within 20 days of its promulgation or revision, the rules say. The general public can also require government agencies to provide information that has yet to be made public, and a response should be given within 30 days.

The regulations are seen as a landmark in efforts to build a more transparent government. China's Constitution does not grant Chinese citizens a right to information. Previous legislation has emphasized protection of state secrets rather than disclosure.

A political campaign to promote “open government” (政务公开) has been under way for more than a decade but this has left information disclosure at government's discretion, according to Clement Chen (陈咏熙), a Guangzhou native and University of Hong Kong Phd candidate who is writing a thesis on freedom of information. The new regulations, he says, make disclosure a statutory obligation whose implementation can be overseen by courts.

Zhang Qiong (张穹), deputy director of the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council, told a press conference in April that the regulations will “facilitate the masses to supervise government departments.”

Zhang stressed that the regulations could play a significant role in curbing corruption. “Keeping the government open and transparent in exercising its power will sharply reduce the possibility of corruption,” he said.

Feng Yujun (冯玉军), an Associate Professor at the People's University, agrees that that anti-corruption efforts underpin the regulations. “China largely relies on Party policies to deal with corruption, and there is no legal framework to handle the issue,” he says. “Actually the

Communist Party's Central Commission for Discipline has been one of the main advocates of change."

## Localities lead the centre

This is not the first time that government transparency regulations have been piloted in China. In early 2003, Guangzhou formulated its own government disclosure rules. However, the subsequent SARS outbreak held back their implementation.

A year later, Shanghai launched its own rules and developed a sophisticated approach to ensure the information flow. The municipal government set up an independent website and a committee dedicated to facilitating the work, making the city a leader in information transparency. By the end of 2006 it had made public a total of 205,000 documents, including policy circulars and statements, statistical digests, reports, government schedules, etc. A survey shows that 95% people in Shanghai are aware of the disclosure rules.

Shanghai's lead has since been followed by many other local governments. Experts estimate that 42% local governments have now issued relevant rules. Seven provinces have developed local laws to govern information transparency.

Huang Chuhui (黄楚惠), a Guangzhou Daily journalist covering the provincial and city People's Congress, says that the local government and Congress have proved cooperative in providing information to journalists. But, he adds, their attitude largely depends on the sensitivity of the topic and their trust of individual media and reporters. "The new national regulation will reinforce our rights to access government information," he says.

Clement Chen notes that local rules on disclosure, and their implementation, have varied widely from place to place. So far, only Shanghai and Wuhan (in Hubei Province) publish annual reports on government information transparency, making it difficult for researchers to evaluate the effectiveness and

enforcement of the rules.

Chen suggests that, in the absence of unified coordination, scattered, local lawmaking has converged into an ongoing bottom-to-top movement, culminating in the new legislation from the central level.

In his view, however, the national regulations are more conservative than some of the local systems that have been piloted. He suggests that pro-transparency activists should use the time remaining before the national rules take effect to push for maximum disclosure in progressive localities, to set high standards for others to follow.

## Falling short of hopes

Chen and other scholars feel that the national regulations fall short of what freedom of information advocates and researchers hope for.

A common concern is that government information involving "state secrets, confidential commercial information and individual's privacy" is off the dissemination list, but there is no clear definition of the scope and conditions of the exemptions. The regulations stipulate that government organs should carefully censor (审查) information before making it public to make sure it does not include secret, confidential or private content.

Experts worry that the vague definition will give government agencies a legal pretext for hiding information. In Guangzhou, the authorities initially decided the SARS epidemic should be kept secret. Although the new disclosure rules were in place before SARS, the government did not reveal the outbreak until it attracted international attention.

In Shanghai, where the regulations and enforcement are most advanced, Chen says that the government has won all related lawsuits by arguing that the information it does not wish to reveal is confidential.

"Most of the lawsuits focus on whether the information should be made public or not. The government has learned the skills to

withhold information by classifying it as non-public," he adds.

None of the legal experts contacted by China Development Brief was aware of any case where the courts required the government to disclose information requested.

Wang Qinghua (汪庆华), Associate Professor at the China University of Political Science and Law, points out that in China court verdicts are themselves not public documents, so it is hard to assess judicial decisions about disclosure.

Another common concern is how the new regulations will link-up with other existing legislation, such as the Law on Guarding State Secrets (保密法), which defines state secrets gives broad but vague definition to the state secrets, says Feng Yujun.

Moreover, Feng notes, the regulations do not create transparency requirements for the Communist Party or the judiciary.

Enforcement will not only depend on government agencies, but also on participation of the general public, whose interest and capacity to work on this issue is yet to be seen. By last May, 18 months after the local rules took effect in Shanghai, there had been less than 40 lawsuits regarding government information, amounting to about 90% of such cases nationwide.

According to Chen "There is still a lack of awareness among the general public that access to government information is their right, not a favour granted by the authorities. They are not used to challenging the government yet."

He believes that lawyers, legal researchers, media and civil society may have critical roles to play in encouraging full enforcement of the regulations. "They should follow and assess the implementation of the regulations and stimulate the public's interest in pursuing government transparency," he says.

In April, Chen established a website ([www.chinesefoi.org](http://www.chinesefoi.org)) to research and report on freedom of information reform in China. He expects the site to attract and stimulate discussion on the issue, and hopes that it might give rise to a new NGO.

## Green cutting edge

Nevertheless, the new rules emerged from a consultation process that involved widespread discussion and revision by many parties.

Finally approved by the State Council in January, the regulations were themselves not made public until three months later. According to Feng, China's top leaders were determined to push the issue but met resistance from some government departments, making it necessary to reach compromises.

The new regulation will not come into effect for another year. Zhang Qiong, of the State Council's Legislative Affairs Office, says that this will give government agencies at all levels time to design their internal procedures to implement the rules.

Li Yujie (李玉洁) from the Open Constitution Initiative (公盟), a Beijing-based legal research NGO, is encouraged by the new regulations. Her organisation is preparing a "Citizen Watch" (公民观察) project that will survey government public services and aim to improve communication between government, the public and the the People's Congress. With the new disclosure regulations in place, she says, she and her colleagues will have better access to relevant government information.

Yu Xiaoyong says that change will be hard for government, which is long used to monopolising information flows. He does not expect things will change right away as lots of co-ordination needs to be done within the government system before the regulations are fully implemented.

"We have to be patient," he says. "As long as the central government shows willingness to move towards more transparent government, the public and NGOs will have more space to request information to facilitate our work."

## Shorter news stories

**EU, UNDP boost government efforts to manage civil society, biodiversity**

The European Union has deepened its collaboration with the United Nations Development Program in China with an EUR 8.08 million (USD 10.5 million) contribution to a UNDP-managed “Governance for Equitable Development” program, while funds from an earlier EU-UNDP agreement are now beginning to flow to consortia of international NGO and local government agencies partnering on biodiversity conservation projects.

Around 40% of the governance program funds will be devoted to civil society support projects implemented through the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoCA), according to Edward Wu (吴晓晖), UNDP’s Team Leader in Beijing for Rule of Law and Democracy.

The Ministry, says Wu, plans to offer nationwide training for local officials responsible for implementing new regulations on the registration and management of social organizations (社会团体). New regulations, Wu believes, will be published “very soon.” He adds, however, that “The original plan was to enact regulations in 2006 but it has been postponed several times.”

The governance program will also support MoCA in drafting detailed schedules (办法) on implementation of the new regulations once they have been enacted.

In addition, says Wu, MoCA plans a series of forums for government and civil society organizations “to discuss hot topics and difficult issues.” The Ministry, he adds, also wants to establish a national association of civil society organisations in order “to increase networking between government and civil society.”

The remaining 60% of the governance program budget will be divided between two

“rule of law” initiatives involving, respectively, the Legislative Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Supreme People’s Court.

The Legislative Affairs Committee will receive funding and technical assistance for work to broaden public consultation in legislative drafting and to improve supervisory systems and procedures of the NPC.

Cooperation with the Supreme People’s Court will include supporting efforts to improve the state compensation system for victims of crime and exploring ways to resolve civil disputes without recourse to litigation.

***Biodiversity consortia***

Meanwhile, May 22 — designated by the UN as International Biodiversity Day — saw the signing of grant agreements to support five sub-national projects, with a total expenditure of around USD 13 million, under the aegis of an EU-China Biodiversity Program that is also managed by UNDP.

International NGOs will collaborate with local government and agencies and research institutes on each of the five projects, and are contributing counterpart funding.

The Nature Conservancy will work with local partners on conservation and socio-economic development in the north of Yunnan Province.

In Sichuan, Conservation International and TRL Ltd (UK) will be involved in an effort, led by the Sichuan Appraisal Centre, to create environmental assessment guidelines for mining and tourism development plans.

The Beijing-based International Network for Bamboo and Rattan will work with a range of partners in Hunan, Sichuan and Yunnan on sustainable natural bamboo forest management.

In Guangxi, Flora and Fauna International will collaborate on a sustainable limestone forest management project led by the provincial Environment Protection Bureau.

Wetlands International will work with the

State Forestry Administration and local partners on a conservation and socio-economic development project in Anqing, a wetland area in the south of Anhui Province.

Funds for a further 14 “local” projects are expected to be awarded later this year.

Collaboration between a range of partners, including at least one international and one Chinese agency, was required by the bidding process, which began in June 2006 and was managed by UNDP.

“Consortia are a must. We think that without this kind of good partnership being formed we cannot achieve biodiversity conservation,” EU Project Officer, Chen Min (陈民), told China Development Brief. “The three key words for this program are ‘integration’ — both vertical and horizontal — ‘innovation’ and ‘partnership’”

Meanwhile, she says, a total of EUR 6.5 million has been allocated for work at national level to strengthen line ministries’ capacity and harmonise their operations.

A program management office was established in August 2006 and is currently engaged in background research and baseline studies.

A further EUR 2 million has been allocated to public education campaigns and raising the project’s “visibility.”

### ***Donor harmonisation***

These projects depart from the EU Delegation’s earlier practice in China of reaching bilateral financing agreements with government partners and then contracting European consultancy companies to implement development projects.

Explaining the new emphasis on working with and through other donors, Leah Vuori, a First Secretary to the EU Delegation in Beijing with responsibility for governance and social sector programs, told China Development Brief that “Governance is such a multifaceted issue and an area where donor coordination is very important — otherwise with the kind of funds

we have in a big country like China we cannot do much.”

Several bilaterally implemented EU projects in China were in the past dogged by delays, owing in part to complex tendering and procurement processes.

Ms Vuori now notes that “We have a global agreement with UNDP so that if we cooperate they don’t have to follow our normal tendering procedures.”

NY May 22, 2007

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### **“Give2Asia” funding channel swells steadily**

At least USD 3 million in donations will be channelled to social development projects in China this year through a “Give2Asia” facility created by the Asia Foundation to link North American donors with Asian grant seekers.

China is the strongest growth area for the facility, which the Asia Foundation first established in 2000. Disbursements began in China in 2003 with a modest USD 166,000, reached USD 1.2 million in 2005 and doubled to USD 2.35 million in 2006. More than 70 China projects are currently funded through the scheme.

China Program Director, Xiao Rong (肖蓉), describes Give2Asia as a “customer service organisation” that facilitates philanthropic flows by finding opportunities for donors who want to make social investments in China but who lack specialised knowledge of the field. Give2Asia, says Xiao, offers an expert network that identifies projects which meet donor criteria, carries out “due diligence” to make sure the projects are constructive and that grantees have the capacity to implement them, and then monitors project implementation.

According to Xiao these services were at first used mainly by family foundations and private individuals — notably, Chinese Americans — but there has since been a marked rise in corporate clients, including Johnson & Johnson, Pepsi Co, Starbucks, Cisco, Synopsis, Target.

Now, Xiao says, Give2Asia hopes to do more “outreach” among Chinese grant-seekers, including grassroots NGOs, encouraging them to find potential North American supporters who can use the Give2Asia channel to deliver tax-deductible donations legally and with adequate monitoring.

### **Portfolio highlights**

Typical of early donors is the Little Dragon Foundation, established by Chinese American, Dr. Carter Tseng. The foundation began by supporting a scholarship programme at Tianjin’s Nankai University. It has since donated to four more projects, mainly in education but also to support the learning and performance of traditional *guqin* (钢琴) music. Lee Kai-fu, CEO of Google (China) has also used the Give2Asia channel for contributions to China Youth Development Foundation programs for college students.

According to Xiao, Chinese people who have settled overseas are often interested in “giving back” to their country of origin. But, she points out, some of them have not lived in China for many years, so Give2Asia also tries to “educate” potential donors as to present social needs. Microfinance and vocational education are among the areas that Give2Asia is currently recommending for support, and it is working with Chinese partners to design pilot interventions in these areas.

Some donors start with clear priorities and identify prospective partners before turning to Give2Asia for fine-tuning and grant management support. This was the case with Starbucks, which had identified the Soong Qing Ling Foundation as the partner for a

USD 1.5 million grant to support rural teacher training, a scholarship program in 15 teacher training universities in China, and libraries 300 rural primary schools. In this case, Xiao says, “What we do is work with the China Soong Qing Ling Foundation to make sure they have a good project design.” Starbucks plans to donate a total of USD 5 million for education projects in China during the period 2006-10.

Starbucks also wanted to support work in safe water supply and related public education. Give2Asia identified the China Women’s Development Foundation as an implementing partner and worked with the foundation to design an appropriate project. This includes a capacity building component in which Give2Asia will design and deliver project management training for 300 staff from 14 project sites in Yunnan, Chongqing, Ningxia, Guangxi and Hainan. The USD 300,000 project also involves training of community trainers in health issues related to water and sanitation.

Since 2004 Johnson & Johnson has also worked with Give2Asia on a number of public health projects. These have included support for training of nurses in prevention of mother-child transmission of HIV, work to strengthen hospital administration, and pilot projects in schools to identify and manage Attention Deficit Disorder. In addition, the company channels support through Give2Asia to the Stars and Rain (星星雨) Education Institute for Children with Autism.

### **Future plans**

On the international supply side, new Give2Asia clients include two high-tech companies: Synopsis and Target. The former wants to support science education while the latter wants to develop early childhood education for children of migrant workers in Guangdong Province.

Give2Asia is meanwhile scouting for new partners on the demand side. One new

partner is the Development Research Foundation, which is affiliated to the central government's Development Research Centre think-tank and which sees donations from international companies as a potential source of funds for policy research and experimentation in areas such as the provision of free school lunches.

This steady growth of partners on both sides of the Pacific increases Give2Asia's workload and the organisation is now hiring more staff to manage the growing project portfolio.

At the same time, Xiao Rong cautions that some of the less experienced grant recipients need capacity building support to enable them to make the best use of funds. There is no shortage of good ideas and good will, she says, but in some cases "implementation quality needs to be improved, as there are still limitations in their capacity and their idea of management."

NY May 11, 2007

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## China not solely responsible for its ecological footprint, says WWF

Consumers around the world, especially in developed countries, share responsibility for China's growing ecological impact overseas, argues the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) in a new report.

In "Re-thinking China's Outward Investment Flows," published on April 25, the global conservation organisation points out that the main economic driver behind China's growing overseas investment is its demand for natural resources to produce goods for developed country markets.

According to Dennis Pamlin, the report's co-author and WWF International's Global Policy Adviser, most natural resources imported to China are re-exported in the form of value-

added products. For example, he says, 70% of imported timber from Southeast Asian countries is processed into furniture and exported to the United States and European Union.

Sweden has been able to reduce its carbon emissions by 10% because Chinese and Indian companies are producing for its people, he adds.

He further points out that China's exports are dominated by foreign companies in China.

"It's a global challenge," says Pamlin. "And equity must not be forgotten."

The report recommends a "triangular approach" in trade and investment analysis and policy-making, with countries classified into three groups: natural resources providers, manufacturers and consumers. Triangular discussions for sustainable globalisation — instead of the traditional bilateral dialogues — should be established between the countries and regions playing these respective roles. This approach could aid the transition towards a global circular economy, in which consumption patterns provide a higher quality of life with far lower consumption of natural resources.

Despite the fact that China's production suffers from low energy-efficiency and environmental standards, which is also reflected in its overseas investment, WWF still holds high expectations for China.

Chinese infrastructure and investment patterns are still being developed, it says, and this presents a window of opportunity to put in place structures that ensure that both government and business policies support long-term sustainable development.

"Chinese outward investments can be viewed as an indicator of the state of the global economy," the report says. "(It) will affect the way in which the global economy will develop."

CT May 27 2007

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## China in Africa

## A relationship still in the making

*Are China's increased trade, investment and aid flows to Africa a neo-colonial threat or a new opportunity for South-South cooperation? Probably nothing so simple, concludes Nick Young in this review of the growing literature on the topic — but if the relationship is to be “win-win” it must embrace a wider and deeper discussion.*

“China is resigned to the fact that US [global] domination is a cold reality it has to live and contend with. China has come to see globalisation as a way of transforming great power politics and establishing more co-operative forms of interstate competition that can increase the prospects for China's peaceful rise. This has led to a situation where China, while recognising the dominance of the US, seeks to limit it through the UN and other international organisations, and by using its resources to forge stable relations with other countries and regions.”

This analysis is offered by one of the most level-headed studies in a recent spate of China-in-Africa literature: “China in Africa: Implications for Norwegian Foreign and Development Policies,” principally authored by Elling N. Tjønneland. Norway, prosperous but unencumbered by great power pretensions, is relatively well placed among Western nations to

be level-headed about global issues. Former premier, Gro Harlem Brundtland, set a famous precedent in 1987 by heading the Commission that produced “Our Common Future,” a landmark report on sustainable development — which, alas, was more talked about than acted upon.

But Tjønneland's assessment of China's approach to Africa is not the Western norm. More typical is the widespread suspicion that China must be up to no good. This is nowhere more true than in the USA, which is struggling to come to terms with a shifting world order that it may still dominate but that it does not in any simple sense control, and which is meanwhile doing a remarkably bad job of promoting its flagship democracy.

According to the emerging, Western media narrative, China is “resource-hungry.” This suggests a ravaging wolf at Africa's door, while omitting to mention that Europeans and Americans continue to consume most of the world's resources, or that many resources “consumed” by China are used to produce finished goods for export.

China is also frequently presented as a spoiler for transparency, good governance and human rights, which Western donors, NGOs and even, nowadays, corporations congratulate themselves for advancing in Africa.

Yet it is clear to any adult observer that Western aid and diplomacy is driven more by trade, energy and geopolitical interests than by abstract principles or generous impulses. Consider, for example, US military and economic aid to Egypt, totalling around USD 2 billion per year since the beginning of the century and making that country the third main recipient of US aid after Israel and unhappy Iraq. The aid flows in because the US sees Egypt as a key partner in securing “stability” in the Middle East and as a bulwark against “Islamic

fundamentalism.” (Even though, just as in Iran 30 years ago, American support for an undemocratic, secular regime risks strengthening popular demands for a religious state.)

It is not hard, then, to see why Professor Kwesi Kwaa Prah, Director of the Cape Town-based Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society, should say (in an interview last year with Pambazuka News), that:

“It is a bit hypocritical for Western states to be concerned about how China is approaching Africa when they have had centuries of relations with Africa, starting with slavery and continuing to the present day with exploitation and cheating . . . so that a cow in the European community gets a subsidy of \$2 a day and 60 per cent of Africa doesn’t get [earn] that.”

That interview is included in a collection of essays by (mainly) African intellectuals and activists, “African Perspectives on China in Africa,” published this year by Fahamu, a pan-African information platform (and operator of Pambazuka News) that locates itself in “a global movement for human rights and social justice.”

Many of the essays echo Kweis Kwaa Prah’s comment and appear to show that, if only out of weariness with the West, the contributors are prepared to see cooperation with China as offering a new opportunity for development. But there is also clear evidence here that the relationship could rapidly sour if China insists on dealing only with African political elites and neglects the opinions and aspirations of Africa’s civil society.

## What do Africans think?

“The march of neoliberalism within China and its impact on the Chinese people has

advanced hand-in-hand with China’s growing imperialist role abroad,” writes Stephen Marks in an Introduction. Although this sweeping statement does reflect one strand of thinking in the book, the contributions of other authors encompass a considerably wider range of views.

Zimbabwean John Blessings Karumbidza, for example, goes as far as to speculate that:

“In the next half century if all African countries abandoned the colonial languages which create a barrier to cultural unity, China could replace them with one language spoken across the continent. Maybe then a ‘United States of Africa’ — under Chinese ‘prefectship’ — would become possible. After all, China would gain more from a united Africa than from a balkanised continent.” (102-103)

Yet this astonishing — some would say craven — vision of unification under Chinese ‘prefectship’ appears (as if out of nowhere) in the concluding remarks of a chapter that is mainly devoted to critiquing China’s role in Zimbabwe. Karumbidza argues — convincingly — that Beijing’s willingness to deal with the Mugabe regime shows that:

“Chinese ‘non-interference’ [in internal affairs] policy cannot be permanent. The Chinese are well aware of this themselves. Where deals are signed with unpopular dictatorial regimes that could later be revised by a new government, it becomes necessary for the Chinese to protect such regimes. This explains their arming of the ZANU PF government in Zimbabwe. For example, China funded Zimbabwe’s acquisition of military-strength radio jamming equipment to block opposition broadcasts ahead of the 2005 elections.”

Ali Askouri, writing on China in Sudan, also argues that “China interferes deeply in the domestic affairs of its partners, but

always to the benefit of the ruling group,” that “For China, whoever happens to be in power is a friend of China as long as they will guarantee China access to resources,” that Chinese aid has “encouraged elitism, deepened social and class divisions and widened corruption” and is “encouraging dictatorships and tyranny in Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe and elsewhere.”

In sum, Askouri concludes, “Both the Chinese and their elite partners in the Sudan government want to conceal some terrible facts about their partnership. They are joining hands to uproot poor people, expropriate their land and appropriate their natural resources.” He proceeds to reveal the “terrible facts” about China supplying the Sudanese government with arms (in exchange for cotton), about a “scorched earth policy” in the Dinka and Nuer tribal lands of the oil-producing Upper Nile, and about the displacement of riparian communities — from which Askouri himself originates — in the Merowe dam construction project.

Askouri’s is the angriest voice in this collection, which is not surprising given the sorry tale he has to tell. He generalises too quickly from Sudan’s experience of Chinese aid and investment. But so will many others. If nothing else, Beijing needs to recognise that its engagement with some regimes risks besmirching its whole African entente.

## Diversity and division

But Africa is a vast and diverse continent that does not easily lend itself to useful generalisations or, indeed, to a single policy. There is a world of difference between Angola and Egypt; and nearly all African countries themselves encompass considerable ethnic and linguistic diversity. Tanzania, for example,

comprises more than 50 different tribes, stitched by colonial intervention into a patchwork nation that was not of their own devising.

The authors of this volume do not often dwell on that diversity (doubtless taking it for granted), but they tacitly acknowledge it through repeated appeals for unity. Kweis Kwaa Prah:

“If Africa was united today it would be a world power, poor as it is, and it would be capable of dealing with China on its own terms, or with the West on its own terms . . . It is futile for Africans to be pointing fingers whether at the West or at China. Africans have to organise their side of the story as best as they can in their own interests.”

Ndubisi Obiorah (from Nigeria) writes:

“China effectively deals with Africa on its own terms via the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, which is convened by China. The AU [African Union], which should lead Africa’s engagement with China, is enfeebled by the language and culture divides which still plague Africa’s regional politics.”

John Rocha also laments that there is “no clear regional or continental strategy to deal effectively with the myriad of actors,” leaving Africa at the mercy of the big, global players:

“Africa is haemorrhaging while the rest of the world accumulates wealth at its expense through the unbalanced exploitation of its natural resources and the enforcement of a distorted international economic system.”

Rocha evidently does not share Western donors’ feeling that there has been progress towards more fair resource exploitation. For example, he says of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative that it “lacks the necessary political legitimacy within the

continent since it was developed outside and is largely externally driven.”

“There is a need for national, bilateral and multinational mechanisms to manage the intricate web of interests that the increased competition over natural resources will generate,” Rocha concludes. Well, yes. This is close to what the Tjønneland report recommends (“Strengthening the capacity of partner countries and African regional organisations to negotiate and cooperate effectively with China.”) But, of course, it is much easier said than done.

Many of the contributors to the Fahamu book evidently feel that, after a long and painful brush with European colonialism and its neo-colonial aftermath, Africa remains a place that is easy to divide and rule. This sense of vulnerability is only one step away from feeling threatened, as Moreblessings Chidaushe (from Zimbabwe) apparently does when she states that “China is advancing aggressive superpower ambitions and may in the long term harden its stance to ensure their achievement.” It was perhaps also a sense of vulnerability, and the hope that the devil you don’t know might be better than the devil you do, that led to Karumbidza’s remark about African unity under Chinese dominion.

### “Development sans democracy”

Ndubisi Obiorah, in one of the most thoughtful chapters, shows some admiration for China but also fear that its apparent success may lead to “democratic reversal” in Africa.

He does not see China as “neoliberal” but instead emphasises “China’s breath-taking, state-led development.” This, he says, “reinvigorates African critics of the Washington consensus” but may also encourage

“resurgence in the old, anti-Western, anti-democratic tendency among Africa’s intellectuals . . .”

“For some among Africa’s contemporary rulers, China is living proof of ‘successful’ alternatives to Western political and economic models . . . For many of Africa’s ruled who are physically and intellectually exhausted by two decades of economic ‘reform’ supposedly adopted by African governments but driven by Western governments, donors and the IFIs [international financial institutions], China represents the hope that another world is possible in which bread comes before the freedom to vote.”

Obiorah fears that this will lead to “some African governments pointing to China as the poster-child for development sans democracy.”

Zimbabwe is again a case in point, since, as Karumbidza notes, “Mugabe sees democracy and development as mutually exclusive.”

In the light of such examples, Obiorah argues that “A central challenge for civil society in African in the next few years will be an effort to prevent democratic reversal.”

At the same time, however, Obiorah suggests that after a honeymoon period China will have to adjust its approach. It will, for example, need to reconsider the “unrestrained exports of light arms” that “may well end up being used against Chinese companies and nationals operating in Africa.” (Recent kidnappings of Chinese workers in Nigeria and Ethiopia show the dangers all too clearly.)

More generally:

“After an initial phase of snapping up resource extraction concessions, it is almost conceivable that China will be compelled by instability and conflict in Africa to realise that its long term economic interests are best served by

promoting peace in Africa and that this is most likely to come about by encouraging representative government in Africa rather than supporting dictators.”

“Almost conceivable” is highly ambiguous; the copy editor should have requested clarification. Does it mean “almost inevitable” or “an outside chance?” Obiorah’s next sentence tilts towards inevitability:

“As Chinese investors move beyond resource extraction to investments of a long-term nature, they will increasingly mount pressure on their government to avoid actions or policies likely to exacerbate instability or conflict.”

Well, maybe.

## Discussion sans hyperbole

Given Africa’s complexity, it is entirely understandable that the government of China should want to pursue an African policy of “non-interference in domestic affairs.” Better by far simply to do business and let the locals sort out their own differences.

But Obiorah and other contributors to this book are certainly right to point out that it cannot be that simple. If China wants to establish long term partnerships without promoting an anti-democratic “Beijing model,” it will at the very least need to pursue a wider and deeper dialogue with African societies.

It is, however, important to put China’s role in Africa into comparative perspective.

An unpublished paper (see endnote) by Hong Kong-based researchers, Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, argues convincingly that “China’s footprint in Africa is still not nearly on the same scale as that of the principal Western states (US, UK, France) . . .” and that it is not colonial in nature.

In 2006, they point out, only 8.7% of

Africa’s oil exports went to China (compared to 36% to Europe and 33% to the US); and “only seven out of Africa’s 53 states received a significant portion (5-14%) of the value of their imports from China.” Moreover, they say, Chinese companies are building infrastructure that is “essential to the continent’s industrialisation” (and recognised by the World Bank as such), “at a fraction of the cost charged by Western companies.” And unlike the West, China “does not demand wholesale privatisation and exclusion of the state.” The China in Africa brouhaha, they suggest, is largely driven by Western efforts to discredit China:

“The Western characterisation of China as engaging in an amoral, neo-colonial scramble in Africa has developed out of the larger ‘China Threat’ discourse. The discrediting of China in Africa serves to contain a perceived strategic competitor and to negate the notion of a pluralism of paths of development. This new discourse also retroactively vindicates European colonialism in Africa and constructs the Western self-image as ‘promoters of democracy and good governance’ on the continent — despite US, UK and French continuing support for most of Africa’s authoritarian regimes.”

This is a useful antidote to the most hyperbolic media coverage, but academic papers are unlikely to have much impact on global public opinion and fear of China is by no means exclusively Western. Zambia’s main opposition party campaigned on a platform of ejecting Chinese investors during the 2006 presidential elections, according to Michel Chan-Fishel’s chapter in the Fahamu book, and other chapters note rising resentment (and crime) against Chinese residents in several countries. Resentment may well

increase as the Chinese expatriate population in Africa grows, including populations of migrant Chinese farmers and small traders (who the government of China cannot necessarily control), and as Chinatowns — or China villages — develop.

Sautman and Yan are probably right to see these as processes not of colonisation but of globalisation — which, as several of the Fahamu authors point out, is bringing to Africa numerous other, non-western players, notably, India, Russia and Brazil. But public perceptions matter, even if they are wrong-headed.

The government of China therefore needs to adjust its approach in Africa, if only to avert a global public relations disaster — however irritating it must be to step onto the global stage, where a state of China's size has a legitimate role, to a chorus of boos and hisses.

China needs to engage with a wider range of local actors — not just local authorities — to ensure that local populations are not marginalised from or directly hurt by development projects and processes that it sponsors. Sceptics will cite Tibet and Xinjiang as evidence that China's government is not naturally responsive to local populations. But Karumbidza is probably correct when he says “the Chinese are themselves well aware” that their non-interference stance is untenable in Africa. Because the economic relationship matters to China, its government has a vested interest in long-term stability, and its current rhetoric suggests an understanding that this is best procured by “harmony” and the careful balancing of interests, not by force.

At the same time, it is clear that African intellectuals and civil society activists do not know China — which is also highly diverse and complex — as well as they need to in order to

build a constructive, inter-continental relationship. Rather than assuming the worst, they should develop links and conversations with counterparts in China, recognising that the China-Africa relationship is not yet indelibly formed and can be significantly shaped by the development of such ties.

Westerners typically believe that although China has the largest society in the world it has no civil society worth mentioning. But this is at least to some extent because

China is not easily visible or comprehensible to Westerners, who have a long tradition of finding the Chinese “inscrutable” — a quality that, of course, depends on the cognitive powers of the observer, not the observed. Africans should not be so short sighted.

**China in Africa: Implications for Norwegian Foreign and Development Policies** by *Elling N. Tjønneland with Bjørn Brandtzæg, Åshild Kolås and Garth le Pere, October 2006. Commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Agency for International Development and published by the Christian Michelsen Institute, the report can be downloaded (without charge) from: <http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?2438=china-in-africa-implications-for-norwegian>*

**African Perspectives on China in Africa** edited by *Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks, Fahamu-Networks for Social Justice, Cape Town Nairobi and Oxford. (174 pp) www.fahamu.org*

**Wind from the East: China and Africa's Development** by *Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, paper presented to a conference in Shanghai, May 16-17 2007. Sautman and Yan have previously published several papers on China and Africa, and a more developed version of this draft will be offered for publication shortly.*

## India China Fellowship Program (2008-2010)



### Fellowship Announcement

The economies of China and India have grown spectacularly in the last decade, but millions are still living in extreme poverty in urban and rural areas in both countries.

Today we must ask what kind of prosperous society is possible and desirable.

The India China Institute (ICI) at The New School invites leaders from a variety of fields to grapple with this challenging question during its 2008-2010 fellowship program, Prosperity and Inequality: China and India.

Fifteen fellows — five from India, China, and the United States, respectively — will be chosen to generate new ideas, debate policies, and design solutions. Special consideration will be given to those applicants who want to explore the social, political, cultural, and environmental dimensions of prosperity and inequality. Accordingly, ICI seeks fellowship proposals from established leaders that examine new migration patterns, democratic transformations, urban and rural design strategies, emerging forms of collective empowerment and agency, and other regional developments affecting both countries.

Established leaders from government, higher education, business, non-governmental organizations, media groups, and artistic institutions will develop highly collaborative projects. These projects can include working papers, policy briefs, artistic productions, public exhibitions, and curriculum designs — an unusual array unavailable at more traditional think-tanks and research centers.

Fellows will have the opportunity to intervene in important debates concerning the future of development policy in India and China at all levels. Think of how influential scholars have recently pursued comparative analysis of India and China. For example, Jeffrey Sachs has argued that “China gives the aura of a unified, well-oiled reform engine, but under the surface are the powerful tensions of clashing ethnicities, regional inequalities, large-scale migration, and extensive corruption. In India, nothing is under the surface... Political crisis is always

at hand, yet somehow India stumbles forward.” Similarly, Amartya Sen has argued that “in India, the neglect of social opportunities may be a focus of criticism in a way it may not be in China, whereas the absence of democratic liberties may be more appropriately a focus of a critique of China than it could be of India.”

Looking beyond narrow economic and political indicators, ICI fellows from the public and private sectors will be given the chance to broaden and reshape this dialogue.

### Application Details and Requirements

Scholars, political leaders, urban planners, designers, journalists, artists, and business innovators are all encouraged to apply.

To qualify, you must:

- Be a Chinese or Indian national living or working in India/China for at least 5 years before the date of application\*
- Have a Masters Degree from an accredited university or professional school
- Have 5 to 15 years of professional experience in chosen field
- Be able to travel to India, China and the United States
- Have access to a computer and Internet connection
- Be able to participate in four international residencies

March 17-29, 2008, New York

November 2-9, 2008, China

August 23-30, 2009, India

April 14-18, 2010, place to be determined

Application forms can be found here at [www.indiachina.newschool.edu](http://www.indiachina.newschool.edu). The application packet must include:

- a personal essay between 5-7 pages (double-spaced)
- a current CV or résumé that demonstrates your relevant professional experience
- two letters of recommendations:
  - a nomination letter, preferably from your home institution

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\*U.S. applications will only be accepted from The New School faculty, but U.S. citizenship is not required.

- a letter of reference from an outside institution
- a copy of TOEFL results or a certified/notarized letter from qualified person or an agency attesting to English language proficiency in reading, writing, speaking
- a dossier of publications, professional accomplishments, or a digital portfolio

#### Fellowship Award

A unique feature of the ICI fellowship program is its trilateral focus and collaborative format. During the two-year fellowship period, each India China Fellow will:

- attend four international residencies, all expenses underwritten by ICI
- receive an award of US\$10,000
- receive an additional US\$2,500 to visit India/China prior to first residency

Each residency will consist of workshops, conferences, and retreats that are held for 4 to 12 days in New York, India, and China. In addition, all Fellows will be affiliated with The New School and will have opportunities to engage in its academic programs during the fellowship period.

#### Selection Process

All completed applications undergo a three-tier review process. Applications submitted in India, China, and the United States will be reviewed first by respective national selection committees. Qualified candidates will be evaluated on a number of criteria, including their compatibility with the fellowship theme, as well as their interests in cross-disciplinary and transnational collaborations.

In October 2007, select candidates will be invited for interviews in their home countries. After further evaluation, a group of semi-finalists will be chosen by the national selection committees and referred to an international selection committee in New York City.

The international selection committee will select 15 finalists, 5 from India, 5 from China, and 5 from The United States. These Fellows-Elect will be notified by email and receive formal letters of acceptance containing the terms of the fellowship. The offer letters must be counter-signed and received by January 2, 2008 for applicants to become ICI Fellows.

#### Where to Send Your Application

Applications must be postmarked no later than August 30, 2007. Late applications will not be considered.

#### For Indian Applicants:

India China Fellows Program  
c/o PUKAR  
1-4, 2nd Floor  
Kamanwala Chambers  
Sir P.M. Road  
Fort, Mumbai 400 001  
Tel: +91 22 6574 8152  
Fax: +91 22 6664 0561  
Email: pukar@pukar.org.in

#### For Chinese Applicants:

India China Fellows Program  
c/o Committee on Scholarly Communication with China  
City Plaza Office Tower, Suite 16H  
Shilipu, Chaoyang District  
Beijing 100025  
Tel: +86 10 6556 6322  
Fax: +86 10 6556 2497  
Email: clin@cscprc.org

#### For Applicants from The New School:

India China Institute  
66 5th Avenue, Room 902  
New York, NY 10011  
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Email: indiachina@newschool.edu

#### About the India China Institute

Based at The New School, ICI organizes public lectures, conferences, and workshops in New York, Mumbai, and Beijing. At the core of its activities is the India China Fellowship Program, which brings together experts from India and China together with their U.S. counterparts in a trilateral dialogue.

With its partner offices in Mumbai and Beijing, ICI endeavors to influence how scholars, leaders, and others understand the urban, economic, political, and cultural futures of India and China.

**Details and application for the India China Fellows Program can be found at: [www.indiachina.newschool.edu](http://www.indiachina.newschool.edu)**