November’s China-Africa summit in Beijing was like a coming-out ball for China as a new global force. As well as substantially boosting aid, trade and political ties, it further isolated Taiwan’s pro-independence movement and, as a bonus, gave Beijing extra, pre-Olympics practice in hosting major international events. But there was no sign of civil society at the party; and they should be invited next time.
To many Western observers the summit appeared much less like a meeting of equals than a case of bestride and rule: a resource-hungry superpower in the making marshalling a miscellany of African political elites. Critics point especially to China’s willingness to deal with some of Africa’s least savoury regimes. While bill stickers in Beijing were pasting pictures of giraffes and elephants across the city’s advertising hoardings in preparation for the summit, European NGOs were puzzling over how China might be pressed to use its influence with the government of Sudan in order to moderate that regime’s grossly abusive behaviour in Darfur.
A due sense of history should dull the edge of Western sanctimony. Africa did not fare well under European colonial division and rule, nor in the Cold War’s proxy conflicts (played out in African nations whose boundaries were drawn up in European conference rooms), nor in the process of “structural adjustment” later imposed upon the continent. And Western extractive industries have not been notable for their social responsibility in Africa, despite the new, “win-win” CSR discourse.
It is also worth reflecting how annoying the voice of international advocacy must be to China’s senior political leaders. The demands for environmental restraint, to soften the footprint, to keep disease under control, to respect human rights, for corporations to behave responsibly, etc, all add up to the message that the unsustainable and rapacious development models pursued by Western countries are not an available option for China. Even if the leaders agree with the message—and in some ways they appear to—it must be irritating to hear it from the beneficiaries of unsustainable and rapacious development models. Especially when, rather than respecting how incredibly tough China’s task is, some of the advocacy shows the potential to gel into anti-China sentiment.
We have to hope that China’s political and business elite will decide—in the best traditions of Confucian virtue—to behave more nobly on the global stage than did those Western nations that humiliated China throughout the nineteenth century with wars and “unequal treaties” to promote their trading interests.
Hoping for better leaders is a familiar Chinese pastime. Foreigners are more prone to emphasise the accountability of leadership, and the importance of enlightened self-and mutual interest based on global, “stakeholder dialogue.” Whilst respecting China’s legitimate aspirations, this publication agrees that international discussion and cooperation is more essential than ever in the 21st century, when nearly all issues have a global dimension.
But if that dialogue is to be meaningful it must not be confined only to political and business elites. There should also be regular dialogue and exchange between Chinese and African scholars, journalists, NGOs, trade unions, teachers, students, women’s organisations, farmers. The government of China should allow and enable such links and contacts—without attempting to dominate or direct them—in the understanding that this is the best chance there is for building international friendships that are sustainable and fair.
If there is to be globalisation let it be globalisation of people, not just of capital.