With ten years remaining to meet the internationally agreed Millennium Development Goals, China seems unlikely to achieve water and sanitation targets. Obstacles include scarce, unevenly distributed and increasingly polluted water resources, a legacy of supply side policies, and a confused division of institutional responsibilities. The government is spending more on the water sector, and is also exploring new management mechanisms; but, Matt Perrement reports, planners still seem to find gargantuan development projects more attractive than efficiency gains in the use of existing resources.

Water and sanitation (WATSAN, in the development jargon) are basic, development needs that an earlier UN decade of action addressed and that also feature in the UN Millennium Development Goals for 2015. Yet a cluster of Asian and African nations will struggle to meet the WATSAN Millennium Development Goal—and China is prominent among them.

According to a September assessment by the Asian Development Bank, 1.1 billion people across Asia still live without safe drinking water and 2.6 billion lack access to basic sanitation. WATSAN coverage in China, where many of the waterpoor live, has been improving gradually, but not fast enough. Almost one third of rural Chinese people—more than 300 million—still lack access to improved drinking water resources and 70%—around 660 million—lack access to improved sanitation.

Concerns that global development gains will be eclipsed by failure to meet WATSAN targets prompted the establishment of a Millennium Project Taskforce to address this one issue. Headed by the Stockholm International Water Institute, the Taskforce this year published a report that states, in very frank terms, five guiding principles and ten actions that are essential for achieving the WATSAN target. The principle that most clearly applies to China is that there must be “a deliberate commitment by governments of middle-income countries that do not depend on aid to reallocate their resources so that they target funding to their unserved poor.”

Although China has pondered water shortages since the 1950s, the senior leadership appears in recent years to have undergone a wholesale change of thinking. A new line is enshrined in a 2002 Water Law, which states that water is a limited, strategic economic resource rather than a free good, as it tends to be treated in Marxist economics.

The new law has been matched with increased public spending to tackle what the government sees as the three biggest problems: flooding, shortages and water pollution. The government has also set a 2010 timeline for its own WATSAN targets: by then, 95% of the rural population should have access to improved water and 65% should have sanitary latrines. These are more ambitious than the relevant Millennium Development Goal (of merely halving the unserved populations by 2015). Yet most informed international observers are highly skeptical of China’s ability to reach even the lower target.

Thirsty all over and parched in places

Although notoriously plagued by seasonal floods, China suffers chronic water shortages. Annual renewable water resources amount to just 2,200 cubic metres per capita, according to the Ministry of Water Resources. This is one of the lowest levels of endowment in the world placing China at number 122 in the world rankings.

The distribution of water resources within the country is uneven and characterised by extremes. Crudely (and discounting Tibet, Xinjiang and Qinghai, where low populations make resources appear artificially high), the lines that divides water ‘haves’ from ‘have-nots’ are both north-south and rural-urban, reflecting the boundaries of China’s nine water resource regions (see Figure 1). River systems in the south, including the Yangtze and Zhu (Pearl) supply more than 80% of total water resources, but support only half of China’s population across just one third of its territory. North of the Yangtze some 43% of the total population survives on just 14% of total water resources, in fragile river systems such as the Hai and Huang. There, over-extraction of groundwater has sent water tables tumbling (by 1.5 metres, or roughly 5 feet, per year) and deserts encroaching as far south as Sichuan.

But a north-south picture can still prove misleading. Even adjacent provinces find themselves at opposite ends of the water resource table (see table at end), largely owing to weather patterns. For example, southern Jiangxi enjoys good overall supply, 50% above the national average, whilst neighbouring Zhejiang is 50% below the national average and more comparable to Gansu.

Competition for water between domestic, industrial and agricultural sectors is also striking. Jiangxi and Guangxi, for example, appear water-rich, but the pressures of food production in China’s rice bowl are significant: every kilo of grain produced consumes 5,000 litres of water, according to the International Rice Research Institute. Demand for irrigation in these provinces pushes agricultural water consumption as high as 95% of supply (against a 70% national average), with significant knock-on effects for rural domestic users who have some of the lowest access to improved water supplies in all of China. Nearly 60% lack adequate domestic supplies according to end of year figures for 2002.

As Figure 2 shows, demand is rising steeply in all sectors, but well over half of China’s total water resources are still used for agriculture. ) Hundreds of millions of people continue to depend on farming as their main livelihood; and, although the government is no longer pursuing the 'grain is the backbone' agricultural policy of the Maoist years, it does still worry about national food security. As such, the authorities are reluctant to cut back too far or too quickly on grain farming, even though grain crops require large volumes of water. Nevertheless, if water is regarded as a finite, economic resource, it is hard to justify using more than half of it on agriculture, which now produces only 15% of China’s GDP.

Domestic use still accounts for only a relatively small proportion of total water demand but that demand is set to rise steeply with growing urbanisation, for the simple reason that city people with showers and flush toilets generally use much more water than their country cousins. According to UNDP, fully half of China’s population will be urbanised by 2015. However, the pattern of present urbanisation does not immediately or automatically link new entrants to cities with existing infrastructure. On the contrary, migration has tended to result in the establishment of shanty communities in off-grid, peri-urban areas, where migrants have neither sanitation nor water supplies. This has contrived to push down the proportion of urban populations with WATSAN access, from nominally full coverage in the mid 90s to only 92% now. Migrant communities may be gradually integrated into urban systems, but in most cities infrastructure lags well behind population inflows. “Urbanisation is putting a lot of pressure on existing facilities,” confirms Oluwafemi Odediran, a UNICEF project officer.

Declining quality

Given generalised water scarcity, it would seem essential to ensure the quality of what is available, but this is not yet happening. Continued policy emphasis on economic growth, and an imcomplete set of well-implemented regulations and incentives governing water and the environment, still nurture unchecked industrialisation and the extension of irrigated agriculture as far north as the 'unstable irrigation zone'. The big loser has been China’s rivers, generally used as a repository for sewage as well as industiral wastes and run-off from agri-chemicals. The government now recognises that 80% of surface water is polluted, 20% of it so seriously that the water is not fit for any purpose.

Pathogens from human faeces, used as an organic fertilizer for centuries, stay active for as long as one week and pose the biggest risk to human health, according to Odediran. He argues that the well-established Chinese practice of boiling drinking water, although effective for killing pathogens, has actually become a barrier to progress in other areas of human hygiene because it leads to complacency. Waterborne disease in China is not nearly such a big killer as in Africa.

Nevertheless, Odediran is quick to point out that infants and young children are particularly vulnerable to waterborne and water-washed diseases, and deaths from diarrhea almost certainly still account for a high proportion of under-5 mortality in China’s remote, rural areas. “When you look at the [under-5 mortality] figures for the whole of China, it looks fantastic,” he says, “But in some instances it is even worse than sub Saharan Africa.”

Even if not generally lethal, illness arising from poor hygiene is very widespread and can have lasting effects. For example, says Odediran, children who have survived waterborne hepatitis can suffer stunted growth, reduced weight and even impacts upon the development of the brain. Poor hygiene is also largely to blame for the high incidence of intestinal parasites. Roundworm, whipworm and hookworm infect, respectively, 190 million, 70 million and 40 million Chinese children. These parasitic infections lead to reduced uptake of food nutrients, lethargy and reduced ability to concentrate, thus undermining general physical and intellectual development. Also associated with poor hygiene is Trachoma, which causes blindness and is endemic in parts of northern China according to the International Trachoma Initiative.

UNICEF has actively promote hand-washing in its WATSAN interventions, and says that behavioural change is taking place: in project sites over the period 1996-2000, the proportion of children washing their hands after using latrines increased from 40% to 68%. The new country programme, says Obdediran, will concentrate on hard-to-reach-areas where mortality and morbidity remain high.

Bacteriological contamination is not the only threat to rural drinking water. Sci.Dev.net reported in April that a Chinese government survey, which has not yet been published in full, found 63 million people across a number of provinces to be at risk of fluoride poisoning, which can result in crippling bone and dental disorders. (Other studies in Jiangxi and Guizhou suggest that susceptibility is closely associated with nutrition, notably protein and calcium intake, but also intake of foods, such as corn and chili, that easily absorb fluoride in the air.) Naturally occurring arsenic is also thought to affect around two million people, especially in Shanxi, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang. Government has responded by pledging to bring in water supplies from outside.

Increasing reliance on inorganic fertilizers, which have fuelled grain production since the 1970s, is now also raising health concerns. Nitrate levels in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong are now close to exceeding WHO recommended levels. The US Environmental Protection Agency links nitrates to a potentially fatal condition known as blue baby syndrome (a reduction in the oxygen-carrying capacity of the blood). Nitrogenous fertilizers also threaten China’s lakes and rivers with eutrophication. Yet, despite growing official and NGO interest in ‘eco-agriculture’, the use of inorganic fertilizer very likely to continue increasing, due to the need to improve productivity returns on smallholder farming.

Efficiency first

Whether or not Chinese agriculture needs to rely on chemicals, it is generally agreed that it needs to rely less reliant on water. According to Richard Hardiman, of the EU Delegation in Beijing, targets are already in place to cut agricultural water demand to 50% of total available resources, double domestic use to 8.8%, and allocate the remainder to industry. “How remains the unanswered question,” says Hardiman. Efficiency gains seem to be the most likely answer. “Agriculture has tremendous inefficiencies . . . leakages, harvesting methods,” confirms Hardiman.

Price reforms, which prompted a drop in domestic consumption by almost 50% across former Soviet-block counties of Eastern Europe according to a WWF report, top most lists of essential interventions in China, and the 2002 Water Law includes a commitment to “rationalising pricing.”

In the mid 1990s, domestic users in Beijing were paying only 25% of the actual cost of the water they consumed. (Actual cost at the time was around CNY 5 per cubic metre).There have since been a series of price hikes, and the Municipal Development and Reform Commission is now planning to further raise the price from CNY 3.7 to CNY 4.5 per cubic metre. The Commission has also promised an increase in rates for industrial use.

Yet rates for agricultural use, where demand is highest, remain very low. “Reforms on the agricultural use of water remain limited . . . food prices would rise and this is very sensitive. No decision has been made,” says Hardiman.

The principles of the 2002 Water Law—including price reform, water storage, resource ownership and transparency—have, however, been put into practice in a recently-concluded World Bank financed project in Xinjiang. This reportedly made substantial efficiency gains, partly through technical fixes but also through the creation of Water User Associations, a community-based mechanism for operation and maintenance of irrigation systems. The Bank sees this as a possible model for bringing China’s overall irrigation efficiency in line with much higher, international standards.

Recycling waste water also offers scope for efficiency savings. Manitoba University Professor, Vaclav Smil, has long argued that China needs to create the world’s largest system of municipal and industrial water-treatment plants. WWF China echoes the argument in a special report which points out that water from the UK’s River Thames is used at least three times over a 200 kilometre stretch before being finally discharged to the sea.

A recent amendment to China's Water Pollution Law indeed states that all cities with populations over 250,000 must build water-treatment plants to recycle water.

Since the 1990s, several European bilateral donors have supported construction of urban wastewater treatment plants, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) began financing work in this sector in 1999. The ADB recently approved its largest loan of this kind, USD 100 million for a plant in Jilin, and a new financing round promises more projects that will support integrated water resource management. “This is a good idea,” says Hardiman, “but there are still limitations.” He suggests that placing plants near to industry (where water could be used for cooling) would be most expedient, but warns that pumping water out for irrigation would prove logistically difficult and also require more costly secondary treatment processes.

ADB involvement in the urban water sector also emphasises public-private sector partnerships and corporate management models. An early example was a USD 26.5 million loan made in 1999 to Generale des Eaux of France and Marubeni of Japan to build and operate a treatment and supply plant in Chengdu. This move towards privatization has been fiercely contested by NGOs in other Asian countries and may also prove contentious in China. “Privatisation in Manila has been a failure. It squeezes weak sectors out of the market” according to Zhang Lanying, Director of ActionAid China. ActionAid, she says, favours community-led ownership of water.

The Millennium Project WATSAN Taskforce also urges, in its five basic principles, “deliberate activities to create support and ownership for water supply and sanitation initiatives among both women and men in poor communities.” In rural areas, Water User Assocations may be a means of increasing community participation and control over supplies, but a Ministry of Water Resources policy has also encouraged, since the mid 1990s, the sale by auction of village water supplies, in an attempt to improve management and efficiency.

Several international NGOs have tried in some of China’s most thirsty areas to promote or strengthen low-cost water-saving technologies, ranging from rainwater harvesting to drip irrigation systems and irrigation by injecting water directly into the roots of plants. These are, indeed, areas where China has considerable expertise of its own.

But the big money is going elsewhere. To date China’s largest water investment is the north-south transfer—a supply, not an efficiency fix. Costing as much as USD 59 billion, the water diversion project is symbolic of government thinking—large scale, high technology. And more big-money investments are also planned to increase supply in China’s eastern provinces. According to a China Daily report (October 5), sea water will play a more important role in China’s water struggles, thanks to a new CNY 56 billion (USD 6.9 billion) project which will add to the country’s ten existing desalination plants and provide annual supplies of 100 billion cubic metres by 2020. Treated sea water is expected to make up 37% of the water supply in coastal areas by 2020.

Institutional muddle

Fair and effective management of China’s water resources is hampered by complex institutional arrangements, with confusion or discord over who should do what. A 2004 report in Water International, the journal of the International Water Resources Asssociation, found that river basin commissions in China do not have a full mandate to manage the areas for which they are nominally responsible and are, in any case, riven by cross-boundary disputes. Typically, representatives of different provinces compete over allocations of a river’s resources and state investments. The report also highlights the dichotomy between quantity (responsibility for which recently passed from the Ministry for Land Resources to the Ministry for Water Resources) and quality, (for which the State Environment Protection Agency is responsible.) A lack of clear definitions, problems of administrative transparency and access to information also dog the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law.

“Groundwater is not monitored currently,” says Hardiman, adding that there is no framework to guide officials on where, when or how to take samples. Moreover, “SEPA is not very effective and [local] Environmental Bureaus are under pressure to maintain [economic] growth”. Like other agencies in China’s administrative system, the local Environment Protection Bureaus are caught between two bosses: the national agency responsible for overall policy, and the local government which provides their operating budget. Enforcement of environmental standards remain patchy due to limited staff and lack of incentives for factories to reform working practices or buy in less polluting technologies.

The Water International report concludes that permanent inter-ministerial coordination is required to harmonise laws, institutional arrangements and operational practices. This is easily said, but reconciling the competing interests of the vertical tiers and multiple departments of government is a formidable task in almost any area of China’s administration. In the management of water, conflicts could become sharper as the population continues to grow and to urbanise, placing more demands on a resource that is so critical for the economy, environment and public health.