'Water is a sensitive topic in China' said a Water Bureau official in a rural county seat 50 kilometres southwest of Beijing on a hot July afternoon, explaining to China Development Brief why he would not discuss the subject. 'Besides, if news of our water shortage got out, we wouldn't be able to convince industry to invest in our county'

Just outside of town, however, farmers were more than willing to share their first-hand knowledge. 'Everyone gets their water from the ground, even the Water Company. And the water table is dropping', yelled Mr Zhou over the thunderous clang of a drilling rig in the background.
Mr Zhou, a farmer with a small plot near the county seat, paid CNY 750 (USD 90) for a two-man team to hammer a 15 meter-deep well into the ground. He also laid out CNY 220 for a small electric pump capable of pulling up enough water to irrigate his 1 mu (0.06 hectares) of land. This is considerable outlay for a Hebei farmer, where average yearly rural household income has hovered at around CNY 2,500 (USD 300) since 1999.

'The drought is terrible this year. The water table's dropped two meters this year alone,' said Mr Zhou. Other local farmers also complained of falling water tables, wells drying up, and having to carry water for household use from far away.

The same is likely happening this year in many parts of North China--the area located within the Hai, Huai and Yellow River basins (the '3-H Rivers'), comprising all Shandong and Shanxi, Beijing and Tianjin, most of Hebei, Henan, Ningxia, Jiangsu, Shaanxi and parts of Inner Mongolia, Anhui and Qinghai.

This area has a population of 400 million but only 500 cubic metres of fresh water per capita per year, less than 10% of the world average. Yet it remains China's breadbasket, producing more than half the country's major grains, despite having only one-fifth of national fresh water resources.

Water has been a critical factor in rising yields over the past 50 years. While only about 10% of agricultural land in most parts of North China was irrigated in 1949,now 85% of arable land is either fully or partially irrigated, accounting for two thirds of agricultural production in the region. (The world average of irrigated to arable land is 17%, while only about 10% of arable land in the United States is irrigated.) Water shortages would have a major impact on farmers' livelihoods and food security.

The seasonal drying up of North China's rivers is the most remarked feature of the area's water shortage. Much the greatest cause for concern has been the annual drying up of the lower reaches of the Yellow River, whose central place in China's history is well deserved.

Some parts of the country owe their very existence to the river. Sediment it carried toward the shallow Bo Hai Sea created a vast area of terra firma in North China --and very recently, by geological standards. Geologists now estimate that the land Tianjin is built upon was laid down by sediment from the river just 900 years ago; while the Beijing plain may have been a shallow sea only 7,000 years ago.

Increased use of upstream Yellow River water has progressively depleted the river's resources. Its lower reaches first dried up in the 1970s for 21 days, but the dry period has since grown rapidly. In 1992, the river failed to reach the Lijin Measuring Station (136km from the estuary) for 82 days. In 1995 the dry spell lasted 118 days, and the following year fully 330 days, cutting grain production in the lower reaches by 2.75 million tonnes--enough to feed nine million people for a year.

The Yellow River is not the only one that now runs dry. A 100 km section of the Liao has been dry since May 9 this year, while 90%of other rivers in Liaoning Province are also dry.¹ Few of the 300 tributaries in the Hai River Basin--encompassing a population of 120 million--now have water in them year--round . In Shandong, during the 1994 drought, 12 of 14 major rivers, 4,926 tributaries and streams, 27,000 reservoirs and 206,000 wells dried up, affecting one million hectares of cropland.

Better management of water resources has partially alleviated the situation. The Yellow River Basin Commission began in 1999 to redistribute water rights to various provinces, shortening the period that the river has run dry since. But cities and farmers on the lower reaches of the river are still hard-pressed for water, and increasingly reliant on what can be sucked ort of the ground.

Tube wells began to appear in large numbers in North China in the 1960s with the availability of gasoline and electric powered pumps. The volume of water extracted from the ground has steadily increased since then as farmers and cities can no longer rely on river water to meet their needs.

Years of massive groundwater overdrafts have lowered the water table considerably, leading to land subsidence in Beijing and Tianjin, and salt water intrusion in coastal areas. Groundwater shortages now also threaten the viability of agriculture in some areas.
Groundwater depletion is the most serious in the Hai River Basin, where 1.58 times the annual volume of groundwater recharged into underground aquifers is being pumped out each year (see chart below). In vast areas of the Hai Plains, the groundwater level has fallen 50 meters since 1949, and it is reported that areas near Beijing must now drill 1,000 meters before finding water.

In the growing competition for available water between cities, industry, and agriculture, the economics of water use do not favour agriculture. One thousand tons of water is needed to produce a ton of grain. The same volume can generate 20 times as much value in industrial output. In a country bent on economic growth and the jobs it generates, the attractions of diverting water from agriculture to industry are compelling. Industrial water use accounted for about 10% of total water demand in 1980s, but that figure jumped to nearly 20% by 2000.

China's Ministry of Water Resources recently told a research team from the US Department of Agriculture that irrigation was the ministry's last priority in allocating water. China's investment in water projects rose as a percentage of total national investment from 2.1 to 5.2% between 1958-1979, but fell back down to 2.5% between the 1985-1990 period. What money is spent rarely goes towards irrigation. In 1997, 74% of the MOWR budget was spent on reservoirs, flood control projects, dykes and hydropower, and only 10% for irrigation. Water is increasingly being diverted to industrial and residential uses. Irrigation's share of water withdrawals in North China dropped from 84% in 1980 to 73% in 1998.

Cities like Beijing, with their massive political clout, are now pressuring other users to give up their claims on both underground and surface water. The water table has fallen so deeply that nearly all wells are dry. The city now pumps water up from aquifers in its suburbs to be piped directly into the city's water network, displacing agricultural users on the urban margin.

Chronic water scarcity in the North is now compounded by problems of quality. Rapid industrial expansion and a marked rise in fertilizer and pesticide use since the 1980s have taken their toll. The 3-H river basins contain nearly half of China's Township and Village Enterprises, including notorious polluters such as paper and leather tanning factories, while chemical fertilizer and pesticide use doubled between 1985 and 1995. By 1995, over 80% of river sections monitored for pollution in the 3-H basins were classified as being seriously polluted, or exceeding Grade 3 standard while fully half of the Hai River failed to even meet Grade 5 standards, meaning the water was unfit for any human use whatsoever.

Grades 1, 2 and 3 permit direct human contact and use as raw water for potable water systems. Grade 4 is restricted to industrial use and recreational use other than swimming. Grade 5 is restricted to irrigation. Water classified below Grade 5 is deemed unfit for any use whatsoever. Source: Clear Water, Blue Skies: China's Environment in the New Century, World Bank 1997

Groundwater quality has also begun to deteriorate. In the Hai River basin, it is estimated that only 37% of total groundwater supplies remain unpolluted. In 1999, 63% of groundwater testing wells in the river basin registered water qualities of Grade 4 standard or below, meaning that the water was not fit for direct human consumption.

The combination of water shortages and pollution has begun to wreak havoc on many communities. Zhanhua County in Henan began in 1989 to transfer relatively clean water from the Yellow River for household consumption, replacing salty groundwater supplies. When the Yellow River started to run dry for long spells in the 1990s, however, the country had no choice but to turn back to the groundwater. Pollutants had already begun to seep into groundwater supplies by then, however, due to the heavy concentration of industry in the area. Residents complained of the layer of oil on the top of groundwater pumped up, and intestinal and liver ailments in the country began to rise.

Polluted ground and river water is often the only source of water for irrigation. Some 667,000 hectares of land is irrigated with polluted water in the Hai River basin alone, 10% of total cultivated land in the basin, with as yet uncalculated health effects.

Water in the Guanting Reservoir, once a source of drinking water for Beijing, has been polluted so badly it is now rated Grade 5 on the water pollution index, and is no longer piped to the city for consumption. High levels of mercury have also been found in rice grown in fields irrigated with polluted water in Beijing's suburbs.

Beijing recently announced a multibillion dollar plan to save its deteriorating water supply and turn Beijing into an 'international city with guaranteed water source and a beautiful water environment,' but this begs the question how other areas will fund water infrastructure projects, particularly rural areas where local governments' strained budgets are often unable even to cover officials salaries.²

In 1953 when Mao Zedong toured the site of the Sanmenxia Dam Project, designed to control flooding on the Yellow River, he allegedly asked the chief engineer how long the dam could be used, if soil conservation measures were undertaken upstream. The reply: 1,000 years. 'What happens in 1,050 years?' Mao reportedly asked.

Engineers today are much more modest, and leaders more focused on the present. A recent World Bank internal review document admits that many of the projects funded by the Bank - since the 1980s, the principle international financiers of China's water projects - only had a planning horizon of 10-20 years.

Instead of lasting 1,000 years, the Sanmenxia Dam began to silt up soon after its completion in 1960. By 1965, holes had to be driven in the base of the dam, and its height lowered, to allow more sediment and water to flow downstream. Less than a quarter of the designed capacity of generators were in the end installed. Up-river silting was so severe that Mao reportedly even considered blowing the dam up.

Nevertheless, technocratic, hydrological approaches remain deeply rooted among Chinese planners, particularly in the Ministry of Water Resources. The middle decades of Communist rule saw a series of major dam projects, often with Soviet assistance. Although these now elderly structures are approaching the end of their working life, risking local catastrophes if they are not shored up or rebuilt, enthusiasm for mega projects remains undimmed in some quarters. Witness the current damming of the Yangzi's Three Gorges, championed by senior leader, Li Peng, himself a hydraulic engineer. Apart from the huge cost of the project (now variously estimated at between USD 22 billion and USD 74 billion), endemic corruption in the contracting process raises doubts whether the structure will ever meet the technical standards envisaged in the design specifications.

Notwithstanding these looming problems, North China's chronic water shortage and recent droughts have rekindled government's interest in South-North 'Water Transfer Project' - a massive inter-basin hydraulic endeavour to carry billions of cubic meters of water via artificial canals from the Yangtze River Basin in the humid south to the parched north.

A chorus of dissent against such large water projects seems to be rising within China, and can even be heard in the corridors of power. Premier Zhu Rongji recently emphasized the need for increased water-use efficiency and pollution control, and government slogans now emphasize water-use reduction and environmental protection at least as a complement to the physical transfer of water.

More trenchant criticism of the water transfer project can be found in journalist Ma Jun's book, Zhongguo Shui Weiji (China's Water Crisis), which is now being prepared for publication in the United States. Mr. Ma charts the destruction that has been wreaked on China's riparian environment since the birth of Chinese civilization, particularly after 1949 when control over China's rivers became a national priority.

He emphasises the anthropological nature of environmental changes, and contrasts the present with the past because, 'people forget that the environment wasn't always like it is now .'

Mr. Ma argues that the high 'external' costs of the proposed water transfer project have mot yet been considered. These include: resettlement of hundreds of thousands of people, destruction of the watershed along the proposed pathways of the transfer route, possibility that the water that will arrive in the Northern cities will already be too polluted for human use ,and the detrimental effects that the transfer will have on the Yangtze. If planners took this into account, they would put more emphasis on alternative methods for solving the shortage of water in North China, Ma contends.

Meanwhile, climate changes at work in North China are exacerbating the already grim water situation. Average rainfall around Beijing has dropped from 600mm to 500mm since the early 1990s , and scientists are still uncertain why.³ Even with water from South-North Transfer Project, there is still expected to be a massive shortage of water in North China in the future. And what water does reach the north will likely be priced well beyond the reach of most farmers. Once underground aquifers are depleted, it will not be possible to increase supply. How will farmers and cities cope?

More and more attention is rightfully being paid to reducing demand for water. Increasing the price of water is the most frequently proposed measure to achieve this, particularly for farmers who--unlike urban residents and work units -- currently pay not by the volume they use, but the area of their irrigated fields. Advocates of more water pricing assert that farmer's water expenses only increase slightly with such schemes, while there are large efficiency benefits from lowered water use. But even a slight growth in expenditure on water could drive farmers' already slender incomes into negative growth. Smallholder agriculture is looking ever less viable across the region. Government has taken some steps to address the issue. A 'Dryland Farming Programme' is underway in certain arid areas of farmland in Northern China under the auspices of the Ministry of Agriculture. The programme includes measures such as plastic film and mulches to reduce surface evaporation, the introduction of drought-resistant crops, intercropping, and a new water-saving sprinkler system.

International organisations are also proposing remedies. In a recent article, Lester Brown of the Worldwide Watch Institute advocates the use of low-energy sprinkler systems and a shift from water-intensive crops to increase agricultural water efficiency. For cities, Brown prescribes composting - rather than water-flushing - toilets, more pollution-control equipment, and a transfer of water saving technology from countries with good track records in industrial water conservation.

In addition to water-pricing measures, a World Bank study published in April, 'Agenda for Water Sector Strategy for North China', recommends a number of technical improvements, such as levelling agricultural fields for more even irrigation, canal lining , on-farm sprinkler systems and pollution controls, as well as institutional reform of water management bodies.

Following Zhu Rongji's lead, the Worldwide Fund for Nature China Programme will this summer also launch a public advocacy campaign backing water-saving measures.

But after three consecutive years of severe drought in North China, some have lost faith in gradual, ameliorative measures as a solution to water shortages. Some Chinese commentators contend that there is simply not enough water for both the city Beijing and the agricultural population surrounding it. The capital should be moved to the humid south, they say. We'll see.

Sources and Resources

World Bank (2001) Agenda for Water Sector Strategy for North China