Are China’s increased trade, investment and aid flows to Africa a neo-colonial threat or a new opportunity for South-South cooperation? Probably nothing so simple, concludes Nick Young in this review of the growing literature on the topic—but if the relationship is to be “win-win” it must embrace a wider and deeper discussion.

“China is resigned to the fact that US [global] domination is a cold reality it has to live and contend with. China has come to see globalisation as a way of transforming great power politics and establishing more co-operative forms of interstate competition that can increase the prospects for China’s peaceful rise. This has led to a situation where China, while recognising the dominance of the US, seeks to limit it through the UN and other international organisations, and by using its resources to forge stable relations with other countries and regions.”

This analysis is offered by one of the most level-headed studies in a recent spate of China-in-Africa literature: “China in Africa: Implications for Norwegian Foreign and Development Policies,” principally authored by Elling N. Tjønneland. Norway, prosperous but unencumbered by great power pretensions, is relatively well placed among Western nations to be level-headed about global issues. Former premier, Gro Harlem Brundtland, set a famous precedent in 1987 by heading the Commission that produced “Our Common Future,” a landmark report on sustainable development—which, alas, was more talked about than acted upon.

But Tjønneland’s assessment of China’s approach to Africa is not the Western norm. More typical is the widespread suspicion that China must be up to no good. This is nowhere more true than in the USA, which is struggling to come to terms with a shifting world order that it may still dominate but that it does not in any simple sense control, and which is meanwhile doing a remarkably bad job of promoting its flagship democracy.

According to the emerging, Western media narrative, China is “resource-hungry.” This suggests a ravening wolf at Africa’s door, while omitting to mention that Europeans and Americans continue to consume most of the world’s resources,or that many resources “consumed” by China are used to produce finished goods for export.

China is also frequently presented as a spoiler for transparency, good governance and human rights, which Western donors, NGOs and even, nowadays, corporations congratulate themselves for advancing in Africa.

Yet it is clear to any adult observer that Western aid and diplomacy is driven more by trade, energy and geopolitical interests than by abstract principles or generous impulses. Consider, for example, US military and economic aid to Egypt, totalling around USD 2 billion per year since the beginning of the century and making that country the third main recipient of US aid after Israel and unhappy Iraq. The aid flows in because the US sees Egypt as a key partner in securing “stability” in the Middle East and as a bulwark against “Islamic fundamentalism.” (Even though, just as in Iran 30 years ago, American support for an undemocratic, secular regime risks strengthening popular demands for a religious state.)

It is not hard, then, to see why Professor Kwesi Kwaa Prah, Director of the Cape Town-based Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society, should say (in an interview last year with Pambazuka News), that:

“It is a bit hypocritical for Western states to be concerned about how China is approaching Africa when they have had centuries of relations with Africa, starting with slavery and continuing to the present day with exploitation and cheating . . . so that a cow in the European community gets a subsidy of $2 a day and 60 per cent of Africa doesn’t get [earn] that.”

That interview is included in a collection of essays by (mainly) African intellectuals and activists, “African Perspectives on China in Africa,” published this year by Fahamu, a pan-African information platform (and operator of Pambazuka News) that locates itself in “a global movement for human rights and social justice.”

Many of the essays echo Kweis Kwaa Prah’s comment and appear to show that, if only out of weariness with the West, the contributors are prepared to see cooperation with China as offering a new opportunity for development. But there is also clear evidence here that the relationship could rapidly sour if China insists on dealing only with African political elites and neglects the opinions and aspirations of Africa’s civil society.

What do Africans think?

“The march of neoliberalism within China and its impact on the Chinese people has advanced hand-in-hand with China’s growing imperialist role abroad,” writes Stephen Marks in an Introduction. Although this sweeping statement does reflect one strand of thinking in the book, the contributions of other authors encompass a considerably wider range of views.

Zimbabwean John Blessings Karumbidza, for example, goes as far as to speculate that:

“In the next half century if all African countries abandoned the colonial languages which create a barrier to cultural unity, China could replace them with one language spoken across the continent. Maybe then a ‘United States of Africa’—under Chinese ‘prefectship’—would become possible. After all, China would gain more from a united Africa than from a balkanised continent.”

Yet this astonishing—some would say craven—vision of unification under Chinese ‘prefectship’ appears (as if out of nowhere) in the concluding remarks of a chapter that is mainly devoted to critiquing China’s role in Zimbabwe. Karumbidza argues—convincingly—that Beijing’s willingness to deal with the Mugabe regime shows that:

“Chinese ‘non-interference’ [in internal affairs] policy cannot be permanent. The Chinese are well aware of this themselves. Where deals are signed with unpopular dictatorial regimes that could later be revised by a new government, it becomes necessary for the Chinese to protect such regimes. This explains their arming of the ZANU PF government in Zimbabwe. For example, China funded Zimbabwe’s acquisition of military-strength radio jamming equipment to block opposition broadcasts ahead of the 2005 elections.”

Ali Askouri, writing on China in Sudan, also argues that “China interferes deeply in the domestic affairs of its partners, but always to the benefit of the ruling group,” that “For China, whoever happens to be in power is a friend of China as long as they will guarantee China access to resources,” that Chinese aid has “encouraged elitism, deepened social and class divisions and widened corruption” and is “encouraging dictatorships and tyranny in Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe and elsewhere.”

In sum, Askouri concludes, “Both the Chinese and their elite partners in the Sudan government want to conceal some terrible facts about their partnership. They are joining hands to uproot poor people, expropriate their land and appropriate their natural resources.” He proceeds to reveal the “terrible facts” about China supplying the Sudanese government with arms (in exchange for cotton), about a “scorched earth policy” in the Dinka and Nuer tribal lands of the oil-producing Upper Nile, and about the displacement of riparian communities—from which Askouri himself originates—in the Merowe dam construction project.

Askouri’s is the angriest voice in this collection, which is not surprising given the sorry tale he has to tell. He generalises too quickly from Sudan’s experience of Chinese aid and investment. But so will many others. If nothing else, Beijing needs to recognise that its engagement with some regimes risks besmirching its whole African entente.

Diversity and division

But Africa is a vast and diverse continent that does not easily lend itself to useful generalisations or, indeed, to a single policy. There is a world of difference between Angola and Egypt; and nearly all African countries themselves encompass considerable ethnic and linguistic diversity. Tanzania, for example, comprises more than 50 different tribes, stitched by colonial intervention into a patchwork nation that was not of their own devising.

The authors of this volume do not often dwell on that diversity (doubtless taking it for granted), but they tacitly acknowledge it through repeated appeals for unity. Kweis Kwaa Prah:

“If Africa was united today it would be a world power, poor as it is, and it would be capable of dealing with China on its own terms, or with the West on its own terms . . . It is futile for Africans to be pointing fingers whether at the West or at China. Africans have to organise their side of the story as best as they can in their own interests.”

Ndubisi Obiorah (from Nigeria) writes:

“China effectively deals with Africa on its own terms via the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, which is convened by China. The AU [African Union], which should lead Africa’s engagement with China, is enfeebled by the language and culture divides which still plague Africa’s regional politics.”

John Rocha also laments that there is “no clear regional or continental strategy to deal effectively with the myriad of actors,” leaving Africa at the mercy of the big, global players:

“Africa is haemorrhaging while the rest of the world accumulates wealth at its expense through the unbalanced exploitation of its natural resources and the enforcement of a distorted international economic system.”

Rocha evidently does not share Western donors’ feeling that there has been progress towards more fair resource exploitation. For example, he says of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative that it “lacks the necessary political legitimacy within the continent since it was developed outside and is largely externally driven.”

“There is a need for national, bilateral and multinational mechanisms to manage the intricate web of interests that the increased competition over natural resources will generate,” Rocha concludes. Well, yes. This is close to what the Tjønneland report recommends (“Strengthening the capacity of partner countries and African regional organisations to negotiate and cooperate effectively with China.”) But, of course, it is much easier said than done.

Many of the contributors to the Fahamu book evidently feel that, after a long and painful brush with European colonialism and its neo-colonial aftermath, Africa remains a place that is easy to divide and rule. This sense of vulnerability is only one step away from feeling threatened, as Moreblessings Chidaushe (from Zimbabwe) apparently does when she states that “China is advancing aggressive superpower ambitions and may in the long term harden its stance to ensure their achievement.” It was perhaps also a sense of vulnerability, and the hope that the devil you don’t know might be better than the devil you do, that led to Karumbidza’s remark about African unity under Chinese dominion.

“Development sans democracy”

Ndubisi Obiorah, in one of the most thoughtful chapters, shows some admiration for China but also fear that its apparent success may lead to “democratic reversal” in Africa.

He does not see China as “neoliberal” but instead emphasises “China’s breath-taking, state-led development.” This, he says, “reinvigorates African critics of the Washington concensus” but may also encourage “resurgence in the old, anti-Western, anti-democratic tendency among Africa’s intellectuals . . .”

“For some among Africa’s contemporary rulers, China is living proof of ‘succesful’ alternatives to Western political and economic models . . . For many of Africa’s ruled who are physically and intellectually exhausted by two decades of economic ‘reform’ supposedly adopted by African governments but driven by Western governments, donors and the IFIs [international financial institutions], China represents the hope that another world is possible in which bread comes before the freedom to vote.”

Obiorah fears that this will lead to “some African governments pointing to China as the poster-child for development sans democracy.”

Zimbabwe is again a case in point, since, as Karumbidza notes, “Mugabe sees democracy and development as mutually exclusive.”

In the light of such examples, Obiorah argues that “A central challenge for civil society in African in the next few years will be an effort to prevent democratic reversal.”

At the same time, however, Obiorah suggests that after a honeymoon period China will have to adjust its approach. It will, for example, need to reconsider the “unrestrained exports of light arms” that “may well end up being used against Chinese companies and nationals operating in Africa.” (Recent kidnappings of Chinese workers in Nigeria and Ethiopia show the dangers all too clearly.) More generally:

“After an initial phase of snapping up resource extraction concessions, it is almost conceivable that China will be compelled by instability and conflict in Africa to realise that its long term economic interests are best served by promoting peace in Africa and that this is most likely to come about by encouraging representative government in Africa rather than supporting dictators.”

“Almost conceivable” is highly ambiguous; the copy editor should have requested clarification. Does it mean “almost inevitable” or “an outside chance?” Obiorah’s next sentence tilts towards inevitability:

“As Chinese investors move beyond resource extraction to investments of a long-term nature, they will increasingly mount pressure on their government to avoid actions or policies likely to exacerbate instability or conflict.”

Well, maybe.

Discussion sans hyperbole

Given Africa’s complexity, it is entirely understandable that the government of China should want to pursue an African policy of “non-interference in domestic affairs.” Better by far simply to do business and let the locals sort out their own differences.

But Obiorah and other contributors to this book are certainly right to point out that it cannot be that simple. If China wants to establish long term partnerships without promoting an anti-democratic “Beijing model,” it will at the very least need to pursue a wider and deeper dialogue with African societies.

It is, however, important to put China’s role in Africa into comparative perspective.

An unpublished paper (see endnote) by Hong Kong-based researchers Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong argues convincingly that "China’s footprint in Africa is still not nearly on the same scale as that of the principal Western states (US, UK, France) . . .” and that it is not colonial in nature.

In 2006, they point out, only 8.7% of Africa’s oil exports went to China (compared to 36% to Europe and 33% to the US); and “only seven out of Africa’s 53 states received a significant portion (5-14%) of the value of their imports from China.” Moreover, they say, Chinese companies are building infrastructure that is “essential to the continent’s industrialisation” (and recognised by the World Bank as such), “at a fraction of the cost charged by Western companies.” And unlike the West, China “does not demand wholesale privatisation and exclusion of the state.” The China in Africa brouhaha, they suggest, is largely driven by Western efforts to discredit China:

“The Western characterisation of China as engaging in an amoral, neo-colonial scramble in Africa has developed out of the larger ‘China Threat’ discourse. The discrediting of China in Africa serves to contain a perceived strategic competitor and to negate the notion of a pluralism of paths of development. This new discourse also retroactively vindicates European colonialism in Africa and constructs the Western self-image as ‘promoters of democracy and good governance’ on the continent—despite US, UK and French continuing support for most of Africa’s authoritarian regimes.”

This is a useful antidote to the most hyperbolic media coverage, but academic papers are unlikely to have much impact on global public opinion and fear of China is by no means exclusively Western. Zambia’s main opposition party campaigned on a platform of ejecting Chinese investors during the 2006 presidential elections, according to Michel Chan-Fishel’s chapter in the Fahamu book, and other chapters note rising resentment (and crime) against Chinese residents in several countries. Resentment may well increase as the Chinese expatriate population in Africa grows, including populations of migrant Chinese farmers and small traders (who the government of China cannot necessarily control), and as Chinatowns—or China villages—develop.

Sautman and Yan are probably right to see these as processes not of colonisation but of globalisation—which, as several of the Fahamu authors point out, is bringing to Africa numerous other, non-western players, notably, India, Russia and Brazil. But public perceptions matter, even if they are wrong-headed.

The government of China therefore needs to adjust its approach in Africa, if only to avert a global public relations disaster—however irritating it must be to step onto the global stage, where a state of China’s size has a legitimate role, to a chorus of boos and hisses.

China needs to engage with a wider range of local actors—not just local authorities—to ensure that local populations are not marginalised from or directly hurt by development projects and processes that it sponsors. Sceptics will cite Tibet and Xinjiang as evidence that China’s government is not naturally responsive to local populations. But Karumbidza is probably correct when he says “the Chinese are themselves well aware” that their non-interference stance is untenable in Africa. Because the economic relationship matters to China, its government has a vested interest in long-term stability, and its current rhetoric suggests an understanding that this is best procured by “harmony” and the careful balancing of interests, not by force.

At the same time, it is clear that African intellectuals and civil society activists do not know China—which is also highly diverse and complex—as well as they need to in order to build a constructive, inter-continental relationship. Rather than assuming the worst, they should develop links and conversations with counterparts in China, recognising that the China-Africa relationship is not yet indelibly formed and can be significantly shaped by the development of such ties.

Westerners typically believe that although China has the largest society in the world it has no civil society worth mentioning. But this is at least to some extent because China is not easily visible or comprehensible to Westerners, who have a long tradition of finding the Chinese “inscrutable”—a quality that, of course, depends on the cognitive powers of the observer, not the observed. Africans should not be so short sighted.

China in Africa: Implications for Norwegian Foreign and Development Policies by Elling N. Tjønneland with Bjørn Brandtzæg, Åshild Kolås and Garth le Pere, October 2006. Commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Agency for International Development and published by the Christian Michelsen Institute, the report can be downloaded (without charge) from: http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?2438=china-in-africa-implications-for-norwegian

African Perspectives on China in Africa edited by Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks, Fahamu-Networks for Social Justice, Cape Town Nairobi and Oxford. (174 pp) www.fahamu.org

Wind from the East: China and Africa’s Development by Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, paper presented to a conference in Shanghai, May 16-17 2007. Sautman and Yan have previously published several papers on China and Africa, and a more developed version of this draft will be offered for publication shortly.